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Abstract: The quest for environmental protection alongside economic development has 
been one of the prominent themes of political and legal discourse for several decades. This 
article examines the extent to which the principle of sustainable development (introduced 
under the Rio Declaration 1992) as a conceptual framework for balancing these competing 
goals has been integrated within the international investment law regime. It does this 
by examining decisions of investment tribunals on disputes relating to the legitimacy of 
government measures on environmental grounds. The analysis evidenced a lack of clear 
principles and mechanisms for balanced consideration of all competing interests; with the 
outcome being generally the subordination of environmental concerns to the protection of 
investors’ economic interests under international investment law. This supports criticism 
that although sustainable development has become one of society’s most sought-after goals, 
progress towards achieving this has been frustratingly slow. Against this background, the 
article goes on to determine whether the outcomes from the hugely anticipated Rio+20 
Conference provided a framework or mechanisms that could promote sustainability 
integration in investment arbitrations. The article fi nds that while the outcome document 
from the main Rio+20 Conference did not provide such a framework, the Declaration from 
the Judge’s Conference, which was organised by UNEP and held simultaneously in Rio, 
provided some principles and mechanisms that, if fl eshed out, could contribute towards 
better integration of sustainability in the investment regime.
1 INTRODUCTION
Reconciling the apparent confl icts between environmental and economic concerns in the 
quest for development has been a key challenge since the problem fi rst came to prominence 
at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972.1 The principle of 
sustainable development was proposed by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development in 19872 as a conceptual framework for addressing the challenge. This was 
* Dr Engobo Emeseh, Lecturer, Aberystwyth University, ege@aber.ac.uk; Ms Akua Aboabea Aboah, currently 
PhD Researcher at the CEPMLP, University of Dundee, a.a.aboah@dundee.ac.uk; and Ms Hamideh Bar-
makhshad, currently PhD Researcher at the CEPMLP, University of Dundee, hbarmakhshad@dundee.
ac.uk.
1 The convening of this conference was driven largely by the environmental movement, which was galvanised 
by a book entitled Silent Spring by marine biologist, Rachel Carson. Published in 1962, the book sought to 
expose the hazards of pesticide use on fl ora, fauna and humans and eloquently questioned humanity’s faith 
in technological progress. See R. Carson, Silent Spring (Houghton Miffl in: Boston, 1962). 
2 WCED, Our Common Future (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1987). Available at: www.un-documents.net/
ocf-02.htm (last accessed 30 August 2012). This report, popularly known as the Brundtland Report, defi nes 
sustainable development as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (p. 43).
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adopted at the fi rst Rio Conference in 1992.3 The resulting Rio Declaration required gov-
ernments, at both national and international levels, to put in place legal mechanisms 
required to achieve the goal of sustainable development.4
In light of its origin, environmental protection and the rational use of natural resources 
is a central component of the sustainable development principle which comprises three 
main pillars (environment, social and economic).5 Principle 4 of the 1992 Rio Decla-
ration clearly recognises this when it provides that ‘in order to achieve sustainable 
development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the develop-
ment process and cannot be considered in isolation from it’.6 Thus, what is envisaged is a 
mechanism that integrates all three components within the development paradigm. The 
current global economic order is predicated on the pursuit of economic growth, which is 
largely dependent on international trade and investment. Transforming the governance 
of these regimes,7 in particular by more effectively integrating environmental, social and 
economic concerns, is therefore crucial to the achievement of sustainable development.8 
In furtherance of this, Agenda 21 specifi cally recognises the need for states to ‘strengthen 
the relationship between existing international instruments or agreements in the fi eld of 
environment and relevant social and economic agreements or instruments’.9 This was 
a notable paradigm shift from the traditional ‘environment-only’ approach of laws and 
policies, to a new system referred to as the ‘law of sustainable development’ wherein envi-
ronmental, social and economic considerations co-exist equally and simultaneously.10
However, implementing this new integrated approach, particularly in terms of how best 
to address tensions between its three recognised pillars, remains problematic, perhaps 
because the meaning and ambit of the principle of sustainable development are essentially 
3 Principles 3 and 4 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992, 31 ILM 874. This was 
adopted at the fi rst Rio Conference – the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
1992.
4 See Rio Declaration, ibid., Principle 11, Chapters 8, 38, 39; Agenda 21 of the Rio Declaration. Available at: 
www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=52 (last accessed 20 October 2012).
5 E. Cavagnaro and G. Curiel, The Three Levels of Sustainability (Greenleaf Publishing Ltd: Sheffi eld, 2012) 
29. 
6 This sentiment has been reiterated in paragraph 4 of the 2012 Rio+20 outcome document, The Future We 
Want, which provides, inter alia, that ‘… promoting sustainable patterns of consumption and production 
and protecting and managing the natural resource base of economic and social development are the 
overarching objectives of, and essential requirements for sustainable development’. Available at: http://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/futurewewant.html (last accessed 30 August 2012). 
7 Although it has been questioned whether sustainable development, with environmental and social concerns 
as its core premise, can even be achieved within the current global economic system. See G. Carvalho, 
‘Sustainable Development: Is it Achievable within the Existing International Political Economy Context?’ 
(2001) 9 Sustainable Development 61–73; H.E. Daly, Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Develop-
ment (Beacon Press: Boston, 1997). 
8 As popularised by the Brundtland Commission’s defi nition, which denotes sustainable development as 
a ‘path that meets people’s needs in a way that the social, economic and environmental stock on which 
that development depends is not depleted in the process’. See H. Bugge and L. Watters, ‘A Perspective on 
Sustainable Development after Johannesburg on the Fifteenth Anniversary of “Our Common Future”: An 
Interview with Gro Harlem Brundtland’ (2003) 15 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 359 
at 363. Also see A. Kolo, ‘Dispute Settlement and Sustainable Development of Natural Resources in Africa’ 
in F. Botchway (ed.), Natural Resource Investment and Africa’s Development (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 
2011) 49–71. 
9 See Agenda 21, above n. 4, Chapter 39(1)(b).
10 The shift was made in Working Group III, at the fourth session of the UNCED Preparatory Committee (New 
York, March 1992), following a proposal by the Brazilian delegate. See P. Sands, ‘UNCED and the Develop-
ment of International Environmental Law’ (1993) 8(2) Journal of Natural Resource and Environment Law 
209–228.
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contested.11 Consequently, while there has been a considerable increase in the number of 
laws and policies on specifi c environmental concerns (and institutions to drive these) at 
both national and international level,12 the integration of sustainable development into 
legal frameworks primarily focused on economic growth, such as international trade and 
investment, has been slow, patchy and tentative. While environmental and social issues 
have been introduced into legal instruments in these regimes, the provisions are drafted 
in a broadly hortatory and aspirational manner rather than the mandatory protections 
granted to economic interests. This prioritises economic considerations, with environ-
mental and social concerns assuming an ancillary role.13 Within this context, the decisions 
of arbitral tribunals play a crucial role in the development of the jurisprudence on sus-
tainable development and the practical integration of its three pillars in these regimes. 
Regrettably, however, there are no guidelines or implementation mechanisms that ensure 
adequate and consistent recognition of the environmental and social components of 
sustainable development by these tribunals. This is still the case even after another UN 
conference (the World Summit on Sustainable Development) held in Johannesburg in 
2002, ten years after the fi rst Rio Conference, focused specifi cally on the challenge of 
implementing the principles of sustainable development.14
What, then, are the implications of this gap for achieving sustainable development and 
to what extent, if any, has the recent Rio+20 Conference15 addressed these concerns? 
This article critically explores these questions through an analysis of one of the main 
international economic law regimes – international investment law – and, in particular, 
the jurisprudence arising from arbitral decisions related to disputes over environmental 
matters. The focus on environment only, rather than both the social and environment 
components, is to enable in-depth analysis of the cases. International investment law, 
along with its associated arbitral decisions, provides a germane and instructive case study 
within the context of the focus of this article. Foreign investment undeniably drives the 
process for economic development in the current world economic order, plays a signifi cant 
role in most countries’ economies, and has been the largest source of external fi nance for 
11 See S. Connelly, ‘Mapping Sustainable Development as a Contested Concept’ (2007) 12(3) Local Envi-
ronment 259–278; D. Springett, ‘Business Conceptions of Sustainable Development: A Perspective from 
Critical Theory’ (2003) 12(2) Business Strategy and the Environment 71–86; A.H.T Fergus, J.I.A. Rowney, 
‘Sustainable Development: Lost Meaning and Opportunity?’ (2005) 60(1) Journal of Business Ethics 17–27; 
T. N. Gladwin, J. J .Kennelly and T.S. Krause, ‘Shifting Paradigms for Sustainable Development: Implica-
tions for Management Theory and Research’ (1995) 20(4) Academy of Management Review 874–907.
12 See R. E. Dunlap and R. Scarce (1991) ‘Poll Trends: Environmental Problems and Protection’ 55(4) The 
Public Opinion Quarterly 651–672; P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law: Frameworks, 
Standards and Implementation (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1995) 34–37.
13 E. Emeseh, ‘Globalisation and Resource Development in Africa: Assessing the Facilitator–Protector Roles 
of International Law and International Institutions’ (2008) 25(5) Development Southern Africa 561–576; 
T. Waelde and A. Kolo, ‘Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and “Regulatory Taking” in Inter-
national Law’ (2001) 50(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 811–848; G. Verhoosel, ‘Foreign 
Direct Investment and Legal Constraints on Domestic Environmental Policies: Striking a “Reasonable” 
Balance Between Stability and Change’ (1998) 29 Law and Policy in International Business 451–479. The 
same argument has been made at national level. See, for instance, A. Ross-Robertson, ‘Is the Environment 
Getting Squeezed Out of Sustainable Development?’ (2003) 2 Public Law 249–259.
14 The main outcomes of this conference, dubbed ‘Rio+10’, are the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustain-
able Development and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. Available at: www.un.org/jsummit/ (last 
accessed 20 September 2012). For a general discussion of the conference and its outcomes, see L. Hens and 
B. Nath (eds), The World Summit on Sustainable Development (Springer Netherlands: Houten, 2005). See 
also H. M. Osofsky, ‘Defi ning Sustainable Development after Earth Summit 2002’ (2003) 26 Loyola of Los 
Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 111.
15 This conference was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 20–22 June 2012. 
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developing countries over the last two decades.16 The main recipient of such investment 
in developing counties has often been the natural resources sector, which is known to 
carry signifi cant environmental and social risks. As the next section will demonstrate, 
there are a plethora of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs),17 as well as some regional 
treaties,18 but there is, as yet, no international instrument on investment which provides a 
binding framework for integrating sustainable development into international investment 
law.19 Consequently, outcomes from arbitral decisions provide a lens though which the 
integration of environmental concerns into the regime may be ascertained. Furthermore, 
the international governance of foreign investments tends to circumscribe, at least in 
some respects, sovereign-state action within their domestic jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the 
lack of fi rm obligations under international law and the fi erce competition for foreign 
investment, especially among developing countries, has substantially strengthened the 
position of the foreign investor in relation to host states.20 Although developing countries 
are far more susceptible to the power of multinational corporations (MNCs), the 2008 
global fi nancial crisis revealed that even the major developed economies had failed to 
regulate MNCs effectively, especially those in the fi nancial sector.21
This article comprises fi ve parts. Following this introduction, section two provides a 
brief overview of international investment law, followed by a more in-depth analysis of 
investment arbitral tribunals’ decisions on environment-related matters in section three. 
Section four evaluates the implications of this analysis for the goal of achieving sustain-
able development. Section fi ve then provides an assessment of the outcomes from the 
two conferences in Rio22 in the light of the stated aims of this article (that is, to identify 
possible ‘mechanisms’ by which courts and tribunals may adopt a broader and more 
consistent interpretative approach to environmental concerns in investment decisions in 
line with the goal of achieving sustainable development). Section six concludes.
2 INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
Foreign investment has burgeoned, particularly over the last three decades, partly as a 
result of the great number of investment agreements designed to protect foreign investors 
16 NCTAD, External Finance, Debt and Foreign Direct Investment. Report by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations to the General Assembly at its fi fty-eighth session, Chapter 2. Available at: http://unctad.org/en/
Docs/gdscsir20041c2_en.pdf (last accessed 3 September 2012). See also UNCTAD, World Investment Report 
2006 – FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for Development 2006 (UNCTAD: New 
York & Geneva 2007); UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment 
Policies (UNCTAD: New York and Geneva 2013). 
17 Bilateral investment agreements refer to an agreement between two states only.
18 There are a few regional investment agreements. See, e.g., the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) (which entered into force on 1 January 1994) between the governments of Canada, Mexico and 
the United States (US), creating a trilateral trade and investment bloc in North America. Other examples 
include the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) signed in December 1994; and the Protocol on Energy Effi ciency 
and Related Environmental Aspects (PEEREA), which came into effect in April 1998. To date, this Treaty 
has been signed or acceded to by 51 states, the European Community and Euratom (bringing the total 
number of signatories to 53).
19 S.P. Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle, 2nd edn (Hart Publishing: 
Oxford, 2012). 
20 See Subedi, ibid. at 41.
21 E. Emeseh, R. Ako, P. Okonmah, and L.O. Obokoh, ‘Corporations, CSR and Self Regulation: What Lessons 
from the Global Financial Crisis?’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal 230–259.
22 See The Future We Want, above n. 6, and the Rio+20 Declaration on Justice, Governance and Law for 
Environmental Sustainability. Available at: www.unep.org/rio20/Portals/24180/Rio20_Declaration_on_
Justice_Gov_n_Law_4_Env_Sustainability.pdf (last accessed 1 September 2012).
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from losing their assets by according to them certain substantive rights.23 These include 
expropriation – protection against the taking, or measures tantamount to the taking 
of property,24 fair and equitable treatment (FET),25 most-favoured nation treatment 
(MFN),26 and national treatment (NT)27 among others.28 However, there are no corre-
sponding substantive obligations for foreign investors.29 In this context, one question 
which has increasingly been the subject of debate among academics is whether there 
is a need for a greater balance between the legitimate rights and interests of all parties 
involved – host states and investors – in investment agreements.30
While the historical context of investment law is important, it is too simplistic to suggest 
that the regime should not be concerned with cardinal environmental, human rights, 
anti-corruption, or other obligations. In line with the principle of sustainable devel-
opment, an holistic approach to development would be for international investment 
agreements to impose direct environmental or other related obligations31 upon foreign 
investors. Unfortunately, all efforts at developing such a regime have failed, particularly 
because developed states did not heed the many calls from the newly emergent states 
to enter into a binding framework.32 The alternative to a multilateral investment treaty 
which entrenches sustainability in the international investment regime is a modifi cation 
of all BITs; a very arduous task bearing in mind that over 3,000 investment agreements 
are currently in force worldwide.33 Even current investment agreements that contain 
environmental protection tend to do so in relatively vague terms; they cannot derogate 
23 P. Sands, J. Peel, A. Fabra and R. Mackenzie, Principles of International Environmental Law, 3rd edn 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2012).
24 Expropriation implies the taking of property either directly or indirectly and has been one of the most 
protected substantive principles of investment law. See A.P. Newcombe, ‘The Boundaries of Regulatory 
Expropriation in International Law’ (2005) 20(1) ICSID Review 1–57.
25 See NAFTA, above n. 18 at Art. 1105, which requires that ‘each contracting party shall, in accordance with 
the provisions of this treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions 
for investors of other contracting parties to make investments in its area. Such conditions shall include 
a commitment to accord at all times to investments of investors of other contracting parties’ fair and 
equitable treatment’.
26 This provision seeks to ensure that the host state (HS) accords treatment no less favourable than that which 
it accords to its own investors, particularly when they are in like circumstances or similar investments. See 
United Kingdom (UK) Model BIT (2005) Art. 3(1).
27 This provision seeks to ensure that the HS accords the same favourable treatment to all foreign investors 
from different countries. See Spain–Argentina BIT (1991) Article IV(2); Plama Consortium Limited v 
Republic of Bulgaria, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005, 44 ILM (2005) 721, paras 191, 195.
28 Usually contractual agreements such as concession agreements. An example is the Argentina–US BIT 
(signed 14 November 1991; entered into force 20 October 1994), Article XI: ‘This Treaty shall not preclude 
the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfi lment 
of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the 
Protection of its own essential security interests.’
29 See Emeseh, above n. 13.
30 L. Peterson, Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties: Mapping the role of human rights law within 
investor-state arbitration (International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 2009) 
Available at: www.dd-rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/globalization/HIRA-volume3-ENG.pdf (last accessed 12 
October 2012).
31 For instance: environment law, public health, human rights law and corruption, among others.
32 Such failed attempts include the Multilateral Agreement on Investments: above n. 19 at 52.
33 M. Malik, ‘Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements: Negotiations and Disputes’, 
Background Papers to the Annual Forum for Developing Country Investment Negotiators, (27–29 October 
2010) IV/2, Available at: www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/dci_2010_recent_developments_iias.pdf (last accessed 20 
October 2012).
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from the substantive protections granted to investors even where serious environmental 
concerns may be at stake.34
Foreign investment protection mechanisms continue to grow rapidly. These include 
dispute settlement mechanisms35 which do not require the exhaustion of local remedies36 
but allow foreign investors to seek arbitration under the substantive reliefs mentioned 
above where there is loss or interference with their foreign investments. Equally signif-
icant is that these investor-state arbitrations under international investment law have 
brought to bear the various overlaps and interactions between international investment 
law and international rules derived from other domains of international law.37
As noted earlier, current international investment law does not offer a systematic set 
of rules that can be applied to decide disputes which are predicated on environmen-
tal concerns resulting in international investment tribunals justifying their reasoning in 
diverse ways and arriving at differing conclusions or outcomes.38 This is set against the 
background of the increasing use by foreign investors of protectionist mechanisms, such 
as investment arbitration, to challenge host state regulatory actions in the environmen-
tal and social sphere as a breach of foreign investment protection rules.39 Investment 
disputes under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) include host state 
regulations on environmental protection, public safety, human health and the regulation 
of water and sewage concessions which were deemed to impact on foreign investment 
property.40
34 A critical look at the US Model BIT affi rms this position. It states that when in doubt, these treaties should 
be interpreted in favorem investors, stressing and expanding their rights so as to promote the fl ow of foreign 
investment: see R. Dolzer, ‘Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?’ (2002) 11 New York University 
Environmental Law Journal 73.
35 Washington Convention on the Settlement of Disputes between States and Nationals of other States 
(entered into force 18 March 1965) 575 UNTS 159 (ICSID). This is referred to as the International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The ICSID Convention is a purpose-built facility of the 
World Bank Group dedicated to the resolution of investment disputes. Available at: http://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp (last accessed 29 January 2010).
36 Some treaties may require exhausting the local remedies or a waiting period before submission to arbitra-
tion will be allowed: the UK–Jamaica BIT permits submission of disputes to ICSID arbitration only if an 
‘agreement cannot be reached through pursuit of local remedies in accordance with international law’. 
However, in contrast to the process under major IHRs instruments, most treaties do not condition access 
to international arbitration upon the exhaustion of domestic legal remedies: see M. Sornarajah, The Inter-
national Law on Foreign Investment, 3rd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 220–221; 
Adriano Gardella v Ivory Coast, 1 ICSID Reports 287; Mobil Oil v New Zealand 4 ICSID Reports 147, 158.
37 See Emeseh et al., above n. 21.
38 For instance, by the use of proportionality in certain disputes. See J. Krommendijk and J. Morijn, ‘Pro-
portional by What Measure(s)? Balancing Investor Interests and Human Rights by Way of Applying the 
Proportionality Principle in Investor-State Arbitration in Human Rights’ in P. Dupuy, F. Francioni and 
E. Petersmann (eds), International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009).
39 Piero Foresti, Laura De Carli and Others v The Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1 – an 
investment treaty arbitration fi led by Italian investors against the South African Government in relation to 
its policy to promote greater racial diversity in management and ownership positions in the South African 
economy.
40 Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America, UNCITRAL Award, 6 June 2009 at para. 8; Mondev Inter-
national Ltd v United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/2, Award, 11 October 2002, para. 
144; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, 11 September 2007, paras 
377–397; Azurix Corporation v Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 14 July 2006 (amicus curiae) 
Decision on Application and Submission by Quechan Indian Nation, 16 September 2005, para. 10; the 
tribunal concluded under Art. 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules and deemed that the tribunal had 
power to accept amicus curiae briefs; Mondev International Ltd v United States of America, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, October 11, 2002, para. 144; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of 
Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award 24 July 2008, para. 602.
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Based on matters of arbitral jurisdiction and other key factors41 in an investment dispute, 
the concept of indirect expropriation or FET may override an environmental claim, 
thereby posing serious concerns for attaining the goal of sustainable development. If 
governments are unduly held liable for the impact of regulations made for valid public-
policy purposes, they will restrict the exercise of their sovereign regulatory obligations for 
the benefi t of their citizens owing to potential claims for breach of investment protection 
rules – the ‘regulatory chill’.42
3 INVESTMENT–ENVIRONMENT DECISIONS
This section explores some investment–environment decisions to ascertain whether there 
is a logical framework by which tribunals assess the legitimacy of governmental measures 
to protect the environment. Environmental concerns are the basis for host state’S action 
in all the cases selected for this analysis. For reasons of consistency and because they have 
given rise to more cases centred on environmental concerns, the analysis focuses mostly 
on disputes under NAFTA. Even though NAFTA is a tripartite treaty and therefore binds 
only Mexico, Canada and the United States of America, its arbitrations break ground into 
unchartered investment dispute terrains – including environmental concerns – and thus 
offer a reference point for other investment tribunals (albeit with the recognition that 
there is no binding rule of precedence in investment arbitration).43 Of about ten cases 
on environment–investment disputes, the discussion that follows focuses on seven which 
encapsulate the main approach adopted by investment tribunals. Following an overview 
of the cases and analysis of the decisions, the article will attempt to identify common 
themes, with the intention of drawing out some conclusions.
41 A key problem in the investment treaty fi eld is that the balance of power between treaty parties and tribunals 
concerning the authority to interpret investment treaties is uneven. In theory, treaty parties are supreme 
when creating the law and tribunals are supreme when applying it in particular cases. In practice, this 
separation is never complete. How treaty parties interpret and apply the law affects what tribunals decide 
in particular cases. In addition, tribunal awards, in particular cases, informally contribute to the interpreta-
tion, and thus the creation, of the law. As a result, some interpretive balance exists between treaty parties 
and tribunals, though neither enjoys ultimate interpretive authority in all circumstances. See A. Roberts, 
‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States’ (2010) 104 American 
Journal of International Law 179; see ICSID, above n. 35, at Art. 25(1), which sets out this limited jurisdic-
tion as ‘The Jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any Dispute arising directly out of an Investment, 
between a Contracting Party (HS) ... a national of another Contracting party (Home state)’.
42 This argument pertains to the view that arbitrations are costly both in fi nancial and reputational terms to 
a nation and can negatively affect its potential to attract investors. The fear of this impact may induce a 
country not to adequately legislate or take measures to encourage the protection of vital environmental, 
human rights or other social concerns. See K. Tienhaara, ‘Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: 
A View from Political Science’ in C. Brown and K. Miles (eds), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and 
Arbitration (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2011) 606.
43 Notwithstanding the non-existence of precedent in the investment arbitration context, there have been 
several instances in which arbitral panels have looked at the decisions, tests and conclusions made by other 
arbitral panels in formulating their interpretation process. For example, in Saipem SpA v People’s Republic 
of Bangladesh (2007) the tribunal ruled that it ‘considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. At 
the same time, it is of the opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international 
tribunals. It believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions estab-
lished in a series of consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to the specifi cs of a given treaty and of 
the circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development 
of investment law and thereby meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors 
towards certainty of the rule of law’: ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommen-
dations on Provisional Measures Award on 21 March 2007 para. 67. Thus decisions such as Metalclad v 
Mexico, though based on the NAFTA, could possibly infl uence another tribunal’s ruling.
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3.1 NON-AFFIRMATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PURPOSE UNDERLYING 
GOVERNMENT MEASURE
In Santa Elena v Costa Rica,44 the investor, Santa Elena Corporation, acquired property. 
It undertook various fi nancial and technical analyses after which it designed a land-
development project comprising a tourist resort and a residential community. However, 
because of the negative impact on a wide variety of tropical wildlife and in light of its 
international environmental obligations, the Costa Rican Government issued an expro-
priation decree for the property. The investors did not object to the expropriation, but 
contested the amount of compensation offered by the government and fi led for arbitra-
tion under the ICSID process.45
The tribunal focused only on the obligation to pay compensation and did not consider the 
environmental merits, considering the international source of the obligation to protect 
the environment to be irrelevant.46 It refused to examine the evidence submitted by the 
Costa Rican Government concerning its international obligations to preserve the confi s-
cated property,47 stating that:
expropriatory environmental measures no matter how laudable and benefi cial to society as a 
whole are … similar to any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to 
implement its policies: where property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, 
whether domestic or international, the state’s obligation to pay compensation remains.48
From this ruling, the Santa Elena award clearly establishes that the purpose of the govern-
mental measure – protecting the environment and competing international obligations in 
this case – does not alter the legal character of the taking for which adequate compensa-
tion must be paid.
Metalclad v Mexico, is rather more convoluted.49 The investor was operating a waste 
landfi ll in the city of Guadalcazur, Mexico, based on a previously received authorisation 
and a landfi ll-operating permit from the federal authority, without obtaining the required 
municipal construction permit.50 During the landfi ll inauguration day, demonstrators 
blocked the entrance51 and the municipality rejected the construction permits for, among 
other things, community opposition and the adverse environmental impact of the landfi ll 
operation.52 Further attempts were then made to reconcile the interests of both parties.
44 Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award, 
17 February 2000.
45 Ibid. at paras 15–21.
46 Ibid. at paras 71, 171. 
47 The text of the Santa Elena award, the sweeping language of the above statements regarding the non-
relevance of states’ international obligations, as well as other decisions of investment tribunals indicate 
that the scope of these statements is confi ned to expropriations. This is particularly true with regard to the 
measure of compensation, for which tribunals generally have a much larger measure of discretion.
48 See Santa Elena, above n. 44 at paras 71–72.
49 Metalclad Corporation v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Award, 30 August 2000.
50 Metalclad claimed (a claim which Mexico denied) that it was assured by Mexico’s National Ecological 
Institute (INE) that, while no municipal permit was required, it would facilitate amicable relations to 
secure such a permit, which could not be denied by the city. Both INE’s president and the director-general 
of the Mexico Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE) advised Metalclad that, except for 
a federal operating permit, all required permits for the facility had been secured by Coterin, the Mexican 
company from which it bought the site. In addition, early 1995 saw the University of San Luis Potosi 
issuing a study on the landfi ll’s environmental impact, fi nding that proper engineering would make the 
landfi ll site suitable. A similar conclusion was reached by PROFEPA, the independent federal offi ce for 
environmental protection.
51 See Metalclad, above n. 49 at para. 18.
52 Ibid. at para. 49.
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However, the event that led to the arbitration was brought about by the state Governor 
who, nearing the end of his term of offi ce, issued a decree establishing a protected natural 
area that included the landfi ll site, thereby effectively preventing its operation, without 
reference to the municipal permit. Metalclad consequently fi led for arbitration under 
NAFTA, claiming a breach of Articles 1110 (expropriation) and 1105 (minimum standard 
of treatment) and requested a compensatory claim for such breaches.53
The tribunal came to the conclusion that Metalclad had been denied FET because the 
municipal government had no authority to deny the construction permit on environ-
mental grounds. Crucially, the tribunal went on to rule that the purpose of a government 
measure need not be considered in this regard and, as such, its test for expropriation was 
solely focused on the extent of the interference with property rights.54
While the concept of legitimate expectations was elucidated throughout the Metalclad 
ruling in that Mexico did not set out lucid and clear procedures for a foreign investor, it 
is notable that the tribunal did not elaborate on the environmental aspects of the dispute. 
In particular, it is not clear how, and on what basis, the foreign investor might reasonably 
expect regulatory interference in an investment with such serious negative environmental 
impacts. Perhaps understandably, the convoluted history of the case appears, prima facie, 
to refl ect the political dimensions of the dispute. However, it is noteworthy that, just as in 
Santa Elena, the tribunal decided not to examine the purpose of the government measure 
or its environmental connotations.
It may, therefore, be safe to conclude that, as in Santa Elena, the tribunal would have 
come to the same conclusion regardless of the evidence on environmental grounds 
leading to the government measure. Thus, both Metalclad and Santa Elena augur badly 
for the principle of environmental sustainability within the investment dispute resolution 
regime, creating concerns amongst environmentalists and government offi cials, not only 
in the NAFTA countries but other legal regimes based on the same rules of investment 
protection.
The ‘regulatory chill’ that could result from such decisions is exemplifi ed in Ethyl v 
Canada,55 which resulted from a ban by the Canadian government of a fuel additive 
(MMT)56 used to provide octane enhancement for unleaded gasoline because of health 
concerns.57 Ethyl, a manufacturer and distributer of MMT, was affected by this ban and 
consequently contested it under NAFTA. Ethyl argued that the ban constituted a breach 
of the expropriation, national treatment and performance requirement rights afforded by 
the NAFTA agreement. With the strong, although contested, arguments made by Canada 
53 Ibid. at para. 1. 
54 Ibid. at para. 111. The Tribunal determined that Metalclad’s investment was completely lost as a result of 
Mexico’s actions and proceeded to estimate the fair market value of the investment. On 30 August 2000, 
a special NAFTA tribunal awarded Metalclad US$16,685,000. This did not include lost profi ts because 
the landfi ll was never in operation, but was based on the actual investment, including 6 per cent annual 
compounded interest made by Metalclad, as evidenced by tax fi lings and independent audit documents.
55 Ethyl Corporation v Canada (Jurisdiction Phase) 38 ILM 708 (1999) 876.
56 Methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT).
57 See Ethyl Corporation v Canada, above n. 55. Health concerns for its citizens were based on the presence 
of manganese in MMT. The dangers of inhaling manganese particles from motor vehicles burning fuel 
containing MMT have been known since the 1800s. Airborne manganese causes neurological impairments 
and symptoms similar to Parkinson’s disease. Studies published in the 1990s in the Public Health Journal 
found ‘compelling evidence of neurotoxicity associated with low-level occupational exposure’ to manganese 
in the air. After fi nding that a gasoline additive was a health risk, Canada drafted a bill to ban the inter-
provincial transportation of the chemical.
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about the environmental and public health risks58 posed by MMT, it is insightful that 
Canada agreed to rescind the MMT ban, paid Ethyl in excess of $19million and took the 
unprecedented step of issuing a statement that MMT was neither an environmental nor 
a health risk.
Another recent dispute in which the tribunal recognised the essential nature of the envi-
ronmental concerns, yet found that government measures in pursuance of them breached 
certain investment rights, is the Marion Unglaube v Costa Rica dispute under the Inter-
national Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) rules.59 The claimants, 
Marion and Reinhard Unglaube, owned properties located in Playa Grande, an important 
site at which female leatherback turtles laid their eggs.60 Given the endangered status 
of this species, and its well-known reputation as an ecotourism destination, Costa Rica 
announced its intention to create a national park in the area and pursued this objective 
through a succession of legal, administrative and court-ordered measures, the stated 
purpose of which was to bring the park into existence.61
The legitimacy of such environmental concerns was acknowledged by both parties. They 
disagreed on the scope of the rights of the Costa Rican Government either to take the 
property of private landowners or to regulate their use of particular properties.62 The 
claimants thus alleged, among other things, expropriation and a breach of FET.63
In its ruling, the tribunal affi rmed the strong, undisputed environmental considerations, 
recognising that the ‘... sharp decline in leatherback populations [is] refl ected quite dra-
matically in the vastly reduced numbers of females nesting at Playa Grande in recent 
years ... [and that] the subject of the protection of endangered species is an important 
one ...’.64 Nevertheless, it reduced the ‘crucial elements’ in the dispute to ‘mundane issues 
of fact and law as they relate to the legality of the actions in dispute between the Parties’. 
Consequently, the tribunal’s role was to ‘determine whether one or more violations of the 
Treaty have occurred, whether compensation is, therefore, due to the Claimants and, if 
so, in what amount?’65
The implication of these cases is that the overpowering nature of investment protection 
rules – in this case the broad defi nition of the right of ‘expropriation’ in NAFTA – creates 
tensions between investment and environmental protection, especially as it has become 
one of the most cumbersome investment rights to defi ne and predict. The fact that in 
Ethyl, Canada could not ban suspected chemical components outright in favour of proven, 
safer alternatives (which, under international environmental norms would be considered 
to be in line with the precautionary principle)66 is testament to NAFTA’s effectiveness 
in constraining the regulatory power of states to act in the public good. This refl ects an 
58 However, there is not enough scientifi c evidence to support MMT’s negative health effects.
59 Marion Unglaube v Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/1.
60 Ibid. at para. 37.
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. at para. 39.
63 Ibid. at para. 97.
64 Ibid. at paras 165, 167.
65 Ibid. at para. 167.
66 See Principle 15, Rio Declaration 1992, above n. 3. The precautionary principle or precautionary approach 
obliges states to take action on serious environmental risk even where there is lack of scientifi c consensus 
or certainty. See generally, J. Cameron and J. Abouchar, ‘Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle 
of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment’ (1991) 14 Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review 1.
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 economic-over-environment scenario, which is precisely the situation that environmen-
talists and regulators both fear: the ‘regulatory chill’ effect.67
3.2 AFFIRMATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PURPOSE UNDERLYING GOVERNMENT 
MEASURE
There have also been instances where tribunals have looked to the purpose of the 
measure in deciding whether or not investment protection rules have been breached. 
Methanex v United States serves as a prime example. The facts of the dispute were that 
California, through an executive order, had called for a phase-out of methyl tert-butyl 
ether (MTBE) in gasoline, in line with report on the ill-effects of MTBE by the University 
of California.68 Interestingly, in addition to confi rming the ill-effects of MTBE, the report 
recommended that California phase out MTBE over several years, rather than implement 
an immediate ban.69 Methanex, in turn, fi led an investor-state dispute challenging the 
Californian measure on the grounds that it was tantamount to expropriation as well as 
being discriminatory.70
In rejecting the claim, the tribunal recognised that the environmental measure adopted 
by the host state did not amount to expropriation and found that the regulation was one 
of general application, in the public interest, scientifi cally justifi ed, and accomplished 
with due process. As such, the tribunal concluded that ‘the California ban was a lawful 
regulation and not an expropriation’.71 Although it has been lauded by environmentalists, 
the judgment has been heavily criticised on the ground that the tribunal did not give clear 
guidelines as to the amount of discretion the host state had to decide on the signifi cance 
of the environmental concerns.
A similar investment dispute, which upheld the environmental legislation, was the dispute 
in Chemtura v Canada.72 Here, voluntary measures were put in place, in collaboration 
with Canada’s Pest Management Regulatory Agency (PMRA),73 to phase out the use of 
lindane pesticide for the treatment of canola seeds in Canada.74 A review of lindane was 
completed and the PMRA decided that regulatory action banning its use on canola seeds 
was necessary. By the time Canada considered banning lindane, the United States had 
already prohibited its use.75
67 J. Ferguson, ‘California’s MTBE Contaminated Water: An Illustration of the Need for an Environmental 
Interpretative Note on Article 1110 of NAFTA’ (2000) 11 Colorado Journal of International Environmental 
Law and Policy 16.
68 The report concluded that there are signifi cant risks resulting from the MTBE contamination of surface 
water and groundwater. Methanex v United States of America, First Partial Award, (Methanex First Partial 
Award), 7 August 2002, para. 26. It was further argued to be a carcinogen to animals and possibly to 
humans. Finally there is found to be ‘no signifi cant additional air quality benefi t to the use of oxygenates 
such as MTBE in reformulated gasoline’ (at para. 12).
69 See Methanex v United States of America, ibid, at paras 13–14.
70 Ibid. at para. 83.
71 Ibid. at para. 7.
72 Chemtura Corporation v Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award, 2 August 2010. 
73 The federal regulator of pest control products in Canada. 
74 See Chemtura Corporation v Canada, above n. 72, at paras 92–96.
75 Ibid. at para. 49. Since then, it has been designated as a possible carcinogen and environmental con-
taminant and identifi ed as the cause of various additional negative health consequences in humans and 
animals, including death. The chemical has been banned or had its use restricted in numerous countries. 
However, Canada has merely restricted its use. Thus, while lindane was no longer permitted to be used in 
pesticides in Canada, it is still an active ingredient in shampoos used to treat head lice: above n. 72, para. 
47. Japan, Germany, New Zealand, Austria, Brazil and Norway have all banned lindane.
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Chemtura, a US-based investor, manufactured a lindane-based pesticide used to treat 
canola seeds and alleged that Canada had violated numerous NAFTA provisions when 
it banned the product for use as a pesticide. The investor argued that the ban, inter alia, 
breached the FET standard and was also an expropriation and claimed compensation for 
losses attributed to the ban.
On the grounds of expropriation,76 the tribunal alluded to the assertion that the lengthy 
regulatory process and related decision were acceptable and, considering the worldwide 
treatment of lindane, Canada was well within its rights to ban its use as a pesticide.77 It 
also stated ‘the evidence shows that the measures did not amount to a substantial depri-
vation of the Claimant’s investment’.78 The arbitrators also took seriously Canada’s claims 
that its actions were taken as a result of its obligations under international environmen-
tal law conventions. While the arbitrators did not view these considerations as shielding 
Canada’s actions from review, they appeared to deem them as evidence of the government 
having acted in good faith with respect to Chemtura and its products.
This dispute and that of Methanex may appear to put to rest concerns that Chapter 11 
of NAFTA impedes public health and environmental regulation. Yet the awards in both 
disputes are troubling. In Chemtura, the award is criticised for not delving into the intri-
cacies of treaty interpretation and construction, and for not setting out any lengthy 
accounts of the tribunal’s reading of the NAFTA protections.79
The tribunal, like the earlier Glamis Gold v United States tribunal, rejected submissions 
by Canada that tribunals should defer to good-faith regulatory measures of govern-
ments but yet, still with scanty elaborations, declined to adopt the approach of the 
earlier Glamis tribunal.80 Canada, Mexico and the United States have argued that 
claimants must satisfy the requirement that regulations have not been made in good 
faith and for a public purpose. However, arbitrators in numerous NAFTA cases have 
rejected this position, thus facilitating investor claims. The tribunal noted repeatedly 
that lindane was banned in many other countries, making it unclear whether the ban 
would have been upheld had Canada been a regulatory leader in limiting the pesticide 
on health or environmental grounds. A similar observation can also be made in respect 
of the Methanex decision.
The Chemtura tribunal did contemplate the idea that regulatory delays might give rise 
to some material economic impact on a foreign investor, but observed that the claimant 
had asserted no independent damages arising from long-running regulatory reviews. The 
76 Above n. 26. Art. 1110(1) states that ‘no party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an 
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization 
or expropriation of such an investment (“expropriation”), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-
discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law …; and (d) on payment of compensation …’
77 Above n. 72, at para. 266.
78 Ibid. at para. 265. The arbitrators took a dim view of Chemtura’s claims, going so far as to remark upon 
the claimant’s ‘elusive’ behaviour and its occasionally ‘disingenuous’ and ‘inconsistent’ arguments in the 
arbitration. Indeed, after dismissing all of Chemtura’s claims, the arbitrators signalled that it would be ‘fair’ 
for the claimant to bear the costs of the arbitration and that it would be ‘just’ and ‘appropriate’ for the fi rm 
to reimburse Canada for half of its legal costs (US$688,219). Chemtura paid half of Canada’s legal costs at 
C$5.778 million.
79 L.E. Peterson, ‘Arbitrators in Chemtura v Canada NAFTA Arbitration take Economical Route in Finding no 
Treaty Breaches’, Investment Arbitration Reporter. Available at: www.iareporter.com/articles/20100916_11 
(last accessed 10 September 2012).
80 See Glamis v United States, above n. 40. This approach requires that the claimant provides affi rmative 
evidence of any alleged expansion of the NAFTA minimum standard of treatment beyond its established 
content in international customary law.
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tribunal’s brief discussion of this issue was redolent of a few other investment treaty 
arbitrations where tribunals appeared to entertain the notion that treaty breaches may or 
may not have occurred, depending upon whether there was some measurable economic 
loss.
The tribunal further stated that the measures in question constitute ‘a valid exercise 
of Canada’s police powers’.81On the facts of the case, the arbitrators saw no ‘substan-
tial deprivation’ of Chemtura’s investments, such that there might be an expropriation 
as per Article 1110 of NAFTA by Canada. Moreover, in a development that might have 
been more widely heralded a decade before, arbitrators also signalled their view that 
Canada’s actions fell within that country’s police powers under international law. Why 
this particular dispute passed this unique ‘police powers’ test is unclear.
The positive outcomes of these two cases demonstrate the potential and promise of inte-
grating environmental concerns into the investment regime through arbitral decisions. 
The downside, however, is that they do not set out clear guidelines to inform other arbitral 
panels, treaty makers, home and host states and foreign investors as to why a particular 
tribunal may or may not acknowledge environmental concerns – a situation which could 
also affect developing countries in further establishing their nascent  environmental 
 legislative jurisdictions.82
Another signifi cance of the Chemtura dispute lies in the fact that, although Canada was 
successful, defending the claim was expensive.83 Ultimately, the Canadian taxpayer spent 
$3 million in defending a challenge to a policy with a signifi cant public purpose, taken by 
a democratically elected government.
3.3 CONSIDERATION (BUT NO AFFIRMATION) OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PURPOSE UNDERLYING GOVERNMENT MEASURES
Apart from those cases where there was neglect of the environmental concerns and 
others where such concerns were affi rmed as the legitimate exercise of the regulatory 
power of the state for public purposes, there is a third category of cases where the 
tribunal accepted the signifi cance of the environmental concerns but still decided that 
there was a violation of the investment agreement rights. One such example is S.D. 
Myers Inc. v Canada.84
This dispute85 concerns a claim for breach of investment rules as a result of the restric-
tion of movement of certain hazardous waste across the Canada–US border in line with 
81 Above n. 72 at para. 266. The tribunal explained that the measures challenged by the claimant constituted 
a valid exercise of the respondent’s police powers. ‘Under Art. 1105 of NAFTA, the [Pest Management 
Regulatory Agency of Canada] took measures within its mandate, in a non-discriminatory manner, 
motivated by the increasing awareness of the dangers presented by lindane for human health and the envi-
ronment. A measure adopted under such circumstances is held to be a valid exercise of the State’s police 
powers and, as a result, does not constitute an expropriation.’
82 M. Sornarajah, ‘A Law for Need or A Law for Greed? Restoring the Lost Law in the International Law of 
Foreign Investment’ (2006) 6 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 329. 
83 Above n. 72. In the end, the total costs associated with the arbitration (including a C$4000 per day fee for 
each tribunal member) amounted to almost C$9 million, with Canada’s outlay at just under C$6 million.
84 S.D. Myers Inc. v Canada, 40 ILM 1408 (2001).
85 Ibid. at para. 84.
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international environmental commitments and public health purposes.86 Export into the 
United States would only be permitted where the prior approval of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) had been obtained. In 1980, the United States closed its borders 
to the import and export of PCB waste and signed an agreement with Canada to reduce 
the transboundary movement of hazardous waste.87 In 1989, Canada signed the Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal (the Basel Convention).88 In 1995, to further the removal of PCB waste in an 
environmentally sound manner in Canada and to prevent any possible signifi cant danger 
to the environment or to human life or health, the Canadian Environment Minister signed 
an interim order banning the export of PCB waste from Canada.89
S.D. Myers Inc. then brought a claim against Canada under Chapter 11 of NAFTA90 stating 
that Canada had, among other things, breached the minimum standard of treatment and 
expropriated their business. The tribunal, in determining the applicable law according 
to Article 1131 of NAFTA, the Transboundary Agreement, the Basel Convention and the 
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAEEC), concluded that 
the Transboundary Agreement between Canada and the United States governed the 
movement of waste between the two countries, not the Basel Convention.91 This was a 
signifi cant snub of an international environmental law instrument. The panel rejected 
Canada’s defence that the enforcement discretion was an unlawful action by the EPA, 
stating that its determination would be based on the actions of the disputing parties on 
the basis of the law as it appeared to exist. Canada passed the interim and fi nal orders and 
did not challenge the legality of the enforcement discretion.92
To determine whether the interim order was a legitimate environmental measure, the 
panel referred to the World Trade Organization/General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(WTO/GATT) precedent and held that ‘where a state can achieve its chosen level of envi-
ronmental protection through a variety of equally effective and reasonable means, it is 
obliged to adopt the alternative that is most consistent with open trade’93 and that the 
environmental objectives of the Canadian Government could have been achieved through 
other means.94
This outcome is quite consistent with the language and the case law arising out of the 
WTO family of agreements. The tribunal based its decision on the factual fi nding that a 
large part of the PCB waste would be transported from Ontario and Quebec to a treatment 
facility in Alberta, which is much farther than to the S.D. Myers facility in Ohio.95 None-
86 Ibid. Both the US and Canada banned the future production of PCB following the Council Decision by the 
OECD in 1973 to control and limit the use of PCBs to reduce the risk to human health and the environ-
ment. In 1977, Canada added PCBs to the toxic substances list under the Environmental Contaminants Act 
replaced by the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) in 1988. The Act was supplemented by 
the PCB waste export regulations of 1990 (PCB Waste Export Regulations, SOR/90-453 (1990) (Can.)). See 
OECD, Protection of the Environment by Control of Polychlorinated Biphenyls C (73) I (Final) (1973).
87 See Myers v Canada, above n. 84. ‘The Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the United States of America Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste’, 28 October 
1986, CTS. 1986 No. 39 (entry into force 11 August 1986) (hereinafter ‘Transboundary Agreement’). 
88 Above n. 84. ‘The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal’, 22 March 1989, 1673 UNTS 57 (entry into force 5 May 1992) (hereinafter ‘Basel 
Convention’). 
89 Explanatory note attached to the interim order. Above n. 84 at para. 123.
90 Ibid. at paras 66–76.
91 Ibid. at para. 213.
92 Ibid. at para. 191. 
93 Ibid. at para. 231.
94 Ibid. at para. 144.
95 Ibid. at para. 56.
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theless, the panel did not address the fact that the shipment of the waste to Ohio was 
only for recycling, after which it would be transferred to Texas for incineration.96 It also 
declared that the ban was not justifi ed by bona fi de environmental concerns, therefore 
there was no legitimate environmental reason for the ban.97
Clearly the tribunal accepted that ‘international law makes it appropriate for tribunals 
to examine the purpose and effect of governmental measures’.98 Nevertheless, in meeting 
its international environmental commitments, the tribunal obliges host states to adopt 
measures that are least inconsistent with investment protection.99Although, on the face 
of it, this may appear innocuous, it is a signifi cant restriction of a sovereign government’s 
margin of discretion in the discharge of its regulatory function for legitimate public 
policy concerns, and results in the ‘regulatory chill’.100 It is debatable whether the tribunal 
is more qualifi ed than the state to determine the most effective means and measures.101
4 INVESTMENT CASE ANALYSIS
The above cases demonstrate a number of key concerns regarding environmental consid-
erations within the international investment regime. The fi rst is the lack of certainty on 
the part of both foreign investors and host state governments regarding how a tribunal 
will view regulatory measures by governments for legitimate environmental purposes 
relative to investment protection rights. Tribunals may totally disregard the purpose, 
however legitimate, of such a measure. Alternatively, they may affi rm that the purpose is 
relevant and might be a legitimate defence to a claim of breach of investment protection 
rules but without any clear criteria or guidelines as to how such a conclusion is reached. 
This leaves both parties unable to effectively assess the ‘risk’ of either their investment or 
regulatory decisions.
A second concern, which is related but fundamentally different from the above, is that 
this opacity demonstrates a lack of, or very slow progress, in integrating environmen-
tal considerations as an essential part of the sustainable development principle in the 
investment law regime. It is questionable how big an impact arbitral decisions can have 
in raising the standard of sustainability, considering that they are case-specifi c and non-
precedential. This gap is crucial because, as noted earlier, investment drives the global 
economy and many of the serious environmental challenges facing the global community 
are rooted in industries or projects fi nanced by foreign investment. If environmental 
concerns are not integral to the investment law regime, or if there is signifi cant uncer-
tainty about investment rights vis-à-vis legitimate environmental concerns, the outcome 
constrains or restricts both policy and decision making, thereby representing a serious 
blow to actualising the more holistic approach to growth and development envisaged 
under the principle of sustainable development.
96 Ibid. See also T. Weiler, ‘A First Look at the Interim Merits Awards in S.D. Myers Inc and Canada: It is 
possible to balance Legitimate Environmental Concern with Investment Protection’ (2001) 24 Hastings 
International and Comparative Law Review 177. 
97 Above n. 84 at para. 43, 60.
98 Ibid. at para. 281.
99 Ibid. at para. 221.
100 M. Hirsch, ‘Interactions Between Investment and Non-Investment Obligations in International Investment 
Law’ in P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino and C. Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment 
Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008) 16.
101 K. Tienhaara, ‘The Expropriation Governance: Protecting Foreign Investors at the Expense of Public Policy’ 
(2011) 2 Journal of World Energy Law & Business 201.
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A third concern is that there is a wealth of evidence that several countries, especially in the 
developing world, have weak regulations and poor enforcement of regulations designed to 
reduce the environmental impact of the operations of multinational companies. Several 
factors, including capacity defi cits and governance challenges, as well as economic factors, 
account for this. The ‘regulatory chill’ from the decisions, as noted above, can only further 
weaken the resolve of such countries to regulate effectively to address legitimate environ-
mental concerns. Countries can, therefore, fi nd themselves locked into maintaining the 
status quo of poor environmental standards.
Furthermore, the rigid way in which investment protection rights are applied fails to 
recognise one of the fundamental realities of environmental regulation – they are very 
much science driven. This not only means that regulation has to evolve in line with the 
science (thus resulting in changes in the status quo that may be considered expropriation), 
but also that there is often a lack of consensus about the risks, causes and effects. Con-
sequently, it is often a matter of judgment on the part of policy and lawmakers whether 
or not to adopt a particular position in the light of available evidence. This underlies 
the precautionary principle in environmental law. As such, even a dispute with ‘positive’ 
outcomes for the environment, such as Methanex, is not particularly helpful as it relies so 
heavily on the scientifi c evidence.
In light of the above, there is clearly a need for a predictable framework or set of 
mechanisms by which tribunals can adjudicate on investment disputes in a manner that 
effectively integrates environmental concerns into the process. While the instinct is to look 
towards an international investment treaty to address these concerns, it is unlikely that 
such a treaty will be forthcoming in the near future, if at all. In light of the short history of 
environmentalism, authoritative soft law instruments have often fi lled the spaces created 
by the absence of binding instruments, becoming launch pads for practical frameworks 
for responding to sustainability challenges. It is within this context that the outcome 
from Rio+20, coming 20 years after the Rio Declaration, had the potential to serve as 
a catalyst on a practical level for advancing sustainability integration within economic 
regimes, including mechanisms to ensure coherent and consistent jurisprudence from 
arbitral tribunals on sustainability integration in a manner that promotes all three pillars 
of the principle. In the next section, we explore the extent to which this was achieved at 
the Rio+20 conference.
5 RIO+20 AND MECHANISMS FOR INTEGRATING 
SUSTAINABILITY IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATIONS
This section considers two documents emanating from Rio+20. The aim is to determine 
whether it sets out principles or mechanisms that could help to facilitate the integra-
tion of sustainability within the investment regime, particularly within the context of 
investment arbitrations. The fi rst is the document from the main conference, while 
the second is from a parallel conference for judges sponsored by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), the UN organ charged with responsibility for the 
environment.
5.1 THE RIO+20 OUTCOME DOCUMENT – THE FUTURE WE WANT
The main Rio+20 Conference produced an outcome document entitled The Future We 
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Want (FWW).102 Although there is some positive analysis of the outcome document,103 
on the whole the FWW was heavily criticised by the majority of civil society groups, envi-
ronmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the media.104 One of the main 
thrusts of this critique was that rather than develop robust policies and implementation 
mechanisms for the integration of environmental and social concerns into the interna-
tional economic system, the provisions of the FWW appeared to empower corporate actors 
whose prioritisation of economic goals within the sustainable development paradigm has 
long hindered the mainstreaming of environmental and social concerns within interna-
tional economic law systems.
The FWW pays scant attention to the current subordination of environmental and social 
concerns within the international investment regime, nor does it acknowledge the absence 
of clear and consistent mechanisms for determining the right balance between economic 
and environmental objectives. Rather, the focus is on the positive aspects of investment 
as a means of ensuring social goals such as education, poverty eradication, infrastructure 
development, and the promotion of ‘green’ products and processes. Indeed, foreign direct 
investment is specifi cally mentioned only once, in paragraph 271, within the context of its 
role in ‘achieving enabling environments for the development, adaptation, dissemination, 
and transfer of environmentally sound technologies’.105
More troubling is the fact that paragraph 58(a) of the FWW appears to affi rm unreserv-
edly current international economic law, and subjugates sustainability principles to it 
when it ‘affi rm[s] that green economy policies in the context of sustainable development 
... should be consistent with international law’. This is a roll-back on the position set out 
in Agenda 21, where it is international law that is required to be made consistent with 
sustainable development when it provides that states should ‘strengthen the relationship 
between existing international instruments or agreements in the fi eld of environment and 
relevant social and economic agreements or instruments’.106 Since the status of sustain-
able development as a principle of international law is still contested, the implication 
of the FWW provision is that policies integrating ‘green’ concerns into the international 
investment regime should be consistent with the established international law protec-
tions on investments outlined earlier in this article. What paragraph 58(a) appears to do, 
therefore, is affi rm the position of investment tribunals in cases such as Marion Unglaube 
v Costa Rica, where arbitrators saw their duty as being to determine ‘mundane issues of 
fact and law as they relate to the legality of the actions in dispute between the parties’ 
rather than look to the purpose of the regulatory measure within the wider framework 
102 This has now been adopted by the UN General Assembly. See The Future We Want, above n. 6. Available 
at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/66/288&Lang=E (last updated 20 September 
2012).
103 A. Powers, ‘The Rio+20 Process: Forward Movement for the Environment?’ (2012) 1 Transnational Environ-
mental Law 403. 
104 G. Monbiot, ‘After Rio, We Know Governments have Given Up on the Planet’, The Guardian, 25 June 
2012. Available at: www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jun/25/rio-governments-will-not-save-
planet (last accessed 22 September 2012); F. Harvey, ‘Global Fight for Natural Resources has Only Just 
Begun’, The Guardian, 12 July 2012. Available at: www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jul/12/global-
natural-resources-food-water?INTCMP=SRCH (last accessed 22 September 2012). Friends of the Earth 
International, ‘A Gift to Corporate Polluters’. Available at: www.foei.org/en/media/archive/2012/rio-20-dec-
laration-a-gift-to-corporate-polluters (last updated 20 September 2012).
105 Above n. 3, Principle 271, which provides that: ‘We underline the need for enabling environments for 
the development, adaptation, dissemination, and transfer of environmentally sound technologies. In this 
context, we note the role of foreign direct investment, international trade and international cooperation in the 
transfer of environmentally sound technologies. We engage in our countries as well as through international 
cooperation to promote investment in science, innovation, and technology for sustainable development.’
106 Above n. 3, Principle 27.
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of sustainable development. Environmental policies could therefore be either stymied or 
never come into being as a result of the ‘regulatory chill’.
A further concern in the FWW document as it relates to investment disputes is its apparent 
watering down of the language of sustainable development by using it interchangeably 
with ‘sustained economic growth’ in various parts of the document.107 In doing so, it 
arguably stands the principle on its head, since the very rationale for the principle of sus-
tainable development is to serve as a check on untrammelled economic growth. Growth 
can be sustained without necessarily being truly sustainable, in the sense of addressing 
all three pillars of the sustainable development principle.
The failings of Rio+20, with its undue emphasis on the international economic system, can 
perhaps be explained by the fact that it took place against the backdrop of the prevailing 
weak global economy, brought on by the worldwide fi nancial crisis. State parties, par-
ticularly capital exporting states, may have felt compelled to prioritise economic growth. 
If that was the case, it is an inherently paradoxical outcome, since the fi nancial crisis 
is perhaps some of the best evidence of the dire consequences of unbridled economic 
growth driven by poorly regulated corporate actors.108
In light of the failings of Rio+20, we look, in the next section, to the outcome from a sister 
conference at Rio+20: The World Congress on Justice, Governance and Law for Environ-
mental Sustainability (The Judges’ Conference), for guidance on appropriate mechanisms 
for integrating environmental issues into the adjudicatory process.109
5.2 THE DECLARATION OF THE RIO+20 JUDGES’ CONFERENCE
The Judges’ Conference, which was attended by over 150 judges and other judicial 
personnel, produced a separate document – the Rio+20 Declaration on Justice, Governance 
and Law for Environmental Sustainability.110 This was much more concise and focused 
on achieving the integration of environmental concerns through judicial and governance 
systems. The focus on the environment component of sustainable development is perhaps 
not surprising, considering that it was sponsored by UNEP.
The preamble and text of the Declaration recognises the pivotal role of adjudicators 
in developing and promoting environmental sustainability. It provides, inter alia, that 
the ‘Judiciary … has been the guarantor of the rule of law in the fi eld of the environ-
ment worldwide and that judicial independence is indispensable for the dispensation of 
environmental justice’ ... and furthermore that ‘... a rich corpus of [judicial] decisions 
… [has had] a lasting effect on improving social justice, environmental governance and 
the further development of environmental law’. Although this text refers to the formal 
judicial sector, there is nothing stopping arbitrators who perform similar functions from 
engaging in such activism to better integrate environmental and social concerns within 
the system. The question though is why this has not happened so far, and what needs to 
be done to encourage such developments. Perhaps the answer lies partly in the fact that 
arbitrators are mainly commercial lawyers whose understanding of sustainable develop-
107 See Rio outcome document (FWW), paras 11, 52, 56, 58e, 94, 158, 281, above n. 102.
108 See Emeseh, above n. 21 for further discussion of the causes of the fi nancial crisis.
109 This sister conference held under the auspices of the UNEP, during the same week as the Rio+20, involved 
over 150 judges, lawyers, and other judicial personnel from across the globe, including chief justices, heads 
of jurisdiction, attorney and auditor generals, chief prosecutors. 
110 Available at: www.unep.org/rio20/Portals/24180/Rio20_Declaration_on_Justice_Gov_n_Law_4_Env_Sus-
tainability.pdf (last accessed 20 September 2012).
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ment would be via the lens of international economic law norms rather than international 
environmental law norms.
This leads on to another key aspect of the Declaration which is its recognition of the need 
for ‘effective dispute settlement systems’ not only at the national level, but also inter-
nationally as ‘[e]nvironmental litigation often transcends national jurisdictions’. This 
view has resonance for the international investment dispute settlement regime. In its 
current form, the system is populated by investment arbitrators who are commercial 
lawyers, with understandably limited awareness of the broader implications of environ-
mental issues or, indeed, environmental norms. For such an adjudicator, the impact of 
investment on endangered species with no apparent immediate implications would have 
a very different meaning than for a judge in a national environmental tribunal. There is 
a strong case, therefore, for the ‘greening’ of a tribunal faced with a dispute involving 
environmental concerns, perhaps by requiring that an environmental lawyer sits as one 
of the panel members, or that sustainability training be a requirement for registration as 
an arbitrator.
On a wider level, it raises the question of whether there ought to be an international 
environmental dispute settlement body, where environmental jurisprudence can be 
developed in a manner similar to the international human rights system. Principles and 
clearly developed criteria in such a forum will assist in promoting effective integration of 
environmental concerns in investment arbitral decisions. Such an arrangement is not too 
far-fetched and can be envisaged within the context of the judges’ call for a strengthened 
role for UNEP (as part of strengthening the international governance institutions on the 
global environment) ‘to effectively lead and advance the global policy and law-making 
agenda for the environment within the framework of sustainable development’.
The Declaration also comes up with a number of principles for advancing environmental 
sustainability which appear to be focused on national regimes rather than at interna-
tional level or non-state mechanisms such as investment tribunals. Considering the 
importance of these tribunals in the development of sustainable development, adopting 
much broader principles which could be applied within these contexts would have been 
valuable. This is particularly important in light of the judiciary in some national regimes 
proactively promoting environmental sustainability even without binding laws.111 A clear 
set of principles could sow the seeds for activism to take root even within investment 
tribunals.
Considering the issue holistically, strengthening national institutions can benefi t more 
effective integration of environmental sustainability in the investment regime. Thus 
the judges’ call for the ‘integrity of institutions and decision-makers’ has relevance for 
the environment-investment disputes. A legal system where environmental laws and 
regulatory and administrative procedures are not transparent provides more opportuni-
ties for foreign investors, and indeed tribunals to question the purpose of environmental 
regulations; or claim that the introduction of such regulation was against their legitimate 
expectation (FET). A consistent and transparent environmental regulatory system would 
provide fewer bases for such claims. Moreover, establishing ‘specifi c criteria for the inter-
111 Examples of this activism can be found in the recognition of environmental rights without express con-
stitutional provisions in a number of countries. For an overview, see Z.M. Nomani, ‘The Human Right to 
Environment in India: Legal Precepts and Judicial Doctrines in Critical Perspective’ (2000) 5 Asia Pacifi c 
Journal of  Environmental Law 113; and N.A. Robinson, ‘A Common Responsibility: Sustainable Develop-
ment and Economic, Social and Environmental Norms’ (2000) 4 Asia Pacifi c Journal of Environmental Law 
195. 
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pretation’ within environmental laws themselves may infl uence the thinking of investment 
tribunals towards interpretations more favourable to the achievement of environmental 
sustainability.
6 CONCLUSION
Over 20 years after the popularisation of the principle of sustainable development by the 
Rio Declaration, its integration into the international economic law systems still remains 
a challenge. Within the investment regime, there are still no binding frameworks for the 
integration of sustainability. Although international investment law instruments now 
contain some provisions on environmental and social concerns, they still remain largely 
ancillary to the binding protections available for the economic interests of investors. Spe-
cifi cally, the lack of appropriate integrations has implications for states’ exercise of their 
regulatory powers in the public interest.
The analysis of arbitral tribunal decisions in this article on disputes relating to the 
legitimacy of government measures made on environmental grounds overwhelmingly 
demonstrates a disregard for the public purpose underlying government measures as 
this was considered irrelevant to the ‘legal’ question of the breach of investor protection 
rules. This is at odds with the goal of the principle of sustainable development, which is to 
ensure a holistic approach to development that considered equally environmental, social 
and economic concerns. Even in the few instances where the environmental measure 
was upheld, the tribunal did not set out a clear rationale or criteria for the decision. This 
creates uncertainty for all parties and to what is known as ‘regulatory chill effect’ where 
states fail to enact or implement environmental measures because of the possible conse-
quences.
Part of the problem is that in the absence of binding legal instruments, the place of 
environmental norms within the investment regime is largely a matter of interpretation 
by arbitrators whose backgrounds and outlook favour the prioritisation of investment 
law norms. They are not helped by a lack of clear principles or mechanisms for inte-
grating environmental and social concerns into the investment regime. Unfortunately, 
despite expectations, the FWW – the outcome document of the main Rio+20 Conference 
– delivered little in the way of principles or mechanisms to address this gap. However, 
the declaration from the Judges’ Conference, which was organised by UNEP and held 
simultaneously with the main Rio Conference, provides some broad principles and 
implementation mechanisms which, if built upon, can help to facilitate a coherent 
and consistent approach for tribunals in determining whether or not a governmental 
measure is legitimately made such that it would not be considered a breach of investment 
protection rules at international law.
However, there needs to be a much more focused fl eshing out of the principles and 
mechanisms contained in the Judges’ Declaration if there is to be any real optimism 
for better integration of environmental sustainability within investment law through the 
rulings of tribunals. These include a requirement for ‘greening’ of arbitral tribunals in 
matters related to environmental or social concerns to ensure expert analysis of the sus-
tainability issues before the tribunal; establishing a clear set of criteria for determining 
when a government measure would be deemed to have been validly made and therefore 
not in breach of international investment protection; and the adoption of a purposive 
approach to the interpretation of investment protection rules in a manner that achieves 
the goal of sustainable development most investment law instruments now aspire to, 
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including in relation to states’ obligations under international environmental law.112 Such 
measures will go a long way towards achieving integration until such a time, if ever, when 
a binding legal regime is established to ensure that all three pillars of sustainable develop-
ment are given due consideration within the investment regime.
112 This will be in accordance with international law on the interpretation of treaties. See Art. 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 
1155 UNTS 331. It provides, inter alia, that: ‘(1) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose.’ 
